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Abstract : For Yoga, ca, ra-Madhyamaka, enlightenment is free of the mistaken
conceptual construction of subject and objects of desire. The Buddha’s awakening
was a state purified of concepts, without desire and suffering. But, subsequently, he
compassionately taught of awakening, and teaching is conceptual. Can
enlightenment be both cognitively pure and concept-utilizing? To secure cognitive
purity while teaching, the philosophers argue that the enlightened person is
cleansed of desire for subject and objects, rather than strictly free of concepts of
subject and objects. To secure teaching after the attainment of pure cognition, they
allow conceptuality, so long as it is free of desire.
Introduction: two ways of reading this paper
The authority of teaching derives, of course, from the qualifications of the
teacher. This consideration is both pressing and complex in the case of sacred
teaching. It is pressing because, for those belonging to a religion, there is nothing
higher – or more fundamental – as a source of guidance for thought and action
than the texts of that religion. It is complex because the source of such teaching
varies hugely within and between religious traditions. Whereas in a majority of
major religious traditions, such teaching is revelation – either directly or though a
special human agent – from a divine being, the epistemological question of the
worth of testimony is subordinated to the question of the existence and nature of
that being. (Secondarily, of course, it could be about the epistemic authority of the
human mediator.) As opposed to mostly theistic Hindu systems, the Mı, ma, m
0
sa,
school boldly combines revelation of sacred texts with authorlessness in a non-
theistic cosmos. The texts are revelations to seers, but from out of the very struc-
ture of reality, not from a specific author. Revelatory authority is separated from
the issue of qualification.
Buddhism goes in the opposite direction. In it there is no revelation of the
nature of the truth, but purely an attainment of insight into that truth by a human
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being. The epistemological question of sacred teaching is all about the quali-
fications of the teacher who has attained teachable religious knowledge. The
authority of the Buddha consists in his having actually gone from being like other
human beings through some state that was the source of the content of his
teachings. His having undergone this, and his activity in consequence, provide the
justificatory basis for taking his teachings as authoritative. In particular, since his
teaching was exactly about attaining the very state that he had attained, what he
underwent is utterly central to his epistemic authority.
This epistemological issue, however, cannot be pursued without complication.
The difficulty lies in the nature of that state which he attained and to which his
teachings are meant to take us. For something about what he underwent seems to
block the very possibility of his being able to teach about it. This paper is an
examination of that difficulty.
Buddhism may well be unique in facing this particular problem (of combining
the attainment of a state with being able to talk about it) in the specific context of
ultimate sacred authority ; for, as students of other religions know, and as has been
mentioned above, other traditions tend to locate the issue of sacred authority in
the context of the revelation, rather than the attainment of truth. But Buddhism
shares with other traditions the problem of accounting for the communicability of
the (on some definition) supposedly ineffable; it is just that other traditions tend
to face this in the context of mysticism.
This paper, therefore, can be read in two different ways. It can be read as an
exploration of the possibility of sacred authority, in which the Buddhist insistence
on the personal attainment of truth contrasts with traditions in which revelation
of truth is paramount. Alternatively, it can be read as a study of an attempt to relate
transconceptual states with linguistic expression, in which the Buddhist concern
with the Buddha’s enlightenment and his subsequent teaching compares with the
concerns of other traditions to articulate the ineffable content of mystical states.
The problematic of teaching and pure cognition
Yoga, ca, ra and Madhyamaka Buddhist accounts usually hold that the}a
Buddha’s enlightenment is a state free of conception but also that such enlight-
enment is expressed in a compassionate, subsequent teaching of the path to it.
The need for freedom from conceptuality arises because concepts are seen as
creating or projecting both the sense of self and experience of a world, where
self and world together form the ground of desire. The self is what desires
and the world is what is desired. And, of course, desire is the cause of suffering.
‘Self ’ and ‘world’ are concepts, and freedom from suffering can come only
through freedom from the concepts that are implicated in suffering. On the other
hand, the enlightened one who dissolves self and world upon realization of the
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emptiness of their nature would be ‘self ’-ish in caring only for liberation for that
psychophysical complex, without thought of the suffering of others. Clearly,
Gautama Siddha, rtha, who became the Buddha, did not act thus, but stayed and
taught the world the Noble Truths. He did this out of compassion for the suffering
of all other creatures. But such teaching, surely, involves the recognition of and
action in the conceptualized world; most obviously, it requires the use of speech.
Therefore, there must be a persistence of conceptuality if an enlightened one is to
act compassionately and teach others about the way to freedom from suffering.
The problem then is to reconcile the conception-free nature of enlightenment with
the conceptual activity required for and in post-enlightenment teaching.
In this paper, I want to focus on two particular solutions given by the eighth-
century Yoga, ca, ra-Madhyamaka synthesizers, S! a, ntaraks
0
ita and Kamalas! ı, la, to this
fundamental problem. It is endemic to Yoga, ca, ra and Madhyamaka, but it seems
to me that these great thinkers, standing at the fulcrum of the Indo-Tibetan tra-
dition, have received insufficient attention in modern scholarship. Kamalas! ı, la
does find a place in the Tibetan stage of his career. There is a famous debate
between him and a Chinese Buddhist monk called Maha, ya, na, in which he argues
that there cannot be a literal cessation of conceptual activity in the enlightened
person even when insight is logically the cessation of conceptualization.
Maha, ya, na’s position is generally characterized in the Tibetan tradition as a com-
mitment to the literal cessation of conceptuality. Kamalas! ı, la makes the point that
the attributes consequent on enlightenment would not be possible without con-
ceptualization of some sort. Arguably, it is his victory in this debate that makes the
Tibetan tradition accept the central tension of conceptuality that is the topic of





Kamalas! ı, la’s Panh jika2 on it, but the present topic is interesting for its combination
of epistemological, axiological and soteriological concerns.
I will state at the very beginning that I propose to take the awakening under the
bodhi tree to have been a state free from conceptual construction of self and world,
a state that occurred in the stream of consciousness located in the psychophysical
complex of the Sa, kya prince, Gautama. Hence, the problematic of this paper
develops only because, using the Yoga, ca, ra(-Madhyamaka) idea of non-
conceptuality, a contrast is drawn between this state pure of concepts and sub-
sequent states, e.g., the first sermon on the Four Noble Truths, that obviously were
conceptual.
The elimination of conceptuality in Yoga, ca, ra (-Madhyamaka) is the elimination
of ignorance about the nature of things. This is because, going back to the
Lanka‘ vata‘ rasu‘ tra3 and Asan0 ga,4 (i.e., the earliest strata of philosophizing in the
school) Yoga, ca, ra takes conceptualization to be the construction of the conditions
of unliberated existence, namely, a subject-self and object world, which do not
exist irreducibly. To understand that there is no single, subject-self and no external
world of objects is to become free of ignorance about the nature of things. This
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freedom is achieved in enlightenment, which is the cessation of conceptuality. The
Buddha’s spiritual authority consisted in his freedom from ignorance about the
nature of things, his freedom from conceptuality.5
The Buddha’s compassion, of course, made him take up teaching, for
which conception-loaded understanding was required. How, then, could he be
enlightened when continuing to use concepts in his teaching? The challenge
for the Yoga, ca, ra-Madhyamaka philosopher is to give a comprehensive account
of insight that resolves the tension between the purity of cognition required
for authoritative teaching and the use of conception required for authoritative
teaching.
The tension can be articulated in two ways. The first is as follows. Pure cognition
is thought to be the highest good because it has been cleansed of the very con-
ceptual constructive activity which leads to the sense of subject-self and object,
and therefore to fear and desire. But teaching of the nature of things seems to mean
grasping exactly the same conceptual constructs that make up their appearance;
and that grasping, surely, is conceptual in itself. So how can the teacher be free of
misunderstanding – through grasping and engaging with the world of bondage –
when teaching? The tension arises here because of the need to ensure cognitive
purity (i.e., freedom from ignorance, attained through nonconceptuality).
The second way is the counterpart of the first. Pure cognition is the tran-
scendence of concepts, yet compassion calls for teaching those who suffer about
the nature of things, and such teaching – for which, exactly, understanding is
required – involves speech, which is nothing other than the verbalization of con-
cepts. Insight is pure but insight brings forth the moral requirement to teach; and
teaching is conceptual. So how can one who is pure of cognition teach? The
tension arises here because of the requirement to teach.
S! a, ntaraks
0
ita and Kamalas! ı, la suggest that what is required for cognitive purity
in effect is psychological purity, and that what is required for teaching is an
acknowledgement of phenomenal impurity.
Before we go any further, it must be recognized – and Kamalas! ı, la does so – that
there is a strategy for denying any tension whatsoever. ‘And others say that,
through the prior impetus of volition, the Lord proceeds to speak even without
conceptuality ’. (TSP, 3358–3361, 1067).6 The crucial link between the observable
behaviour of speech and the inferred existence of conceptuality is severed in this
hypothesis. That means that the purity of cognition is preserved in the stream of
consciousness that is located in the person of the Buddha, for no perceptual and
mental activity occurs. There is only the inertial – mechanical – continuity of ver-
bal activity that is the aftermath of Gautama’s (i.e., pre-enlightenment Buddha’s)
original determination to understand the nature of suffering and its removal. Let
us for the moment grant that this notion of a mechanically-realized psychological
impetus is cogent. Kamalas! ı, la in any case does not pursue this. Presumably, he
does not feel able to take it seriously, for it would go against his requirement for
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the enlightened person to be aware of suffering and, taking pity on the world
( jagadanukampaya‘ ), to return to it exactly to alleviate such suffering.
[A]ctions, such as speaking, moving and so on are all caused by the desire to speak;
and that desire to speak comes about …because of compassion… . It [compassion],
even without any grasping of a self, arises solely on the strength of the repeated
seeing of [all] the particular forms of sufferings (TSP, 3363–3364, 1069).7
It would indeed be difficult to reconcile this richly attitudinal description with
cognitive contentlessness. The gain made by the hypothesis of mechanical teach-
ing, it seems to me, as it seems to have appeared to Kamalas! ı, la, is lost both in the
conceptual problem of giving an account of cognitive content(lessness) and the
doctrinal problem of reconciling it with the compassionate urge of the enlightened
person.8
Psychological purity
The first problem, then, is to see how the demand for cognitive purity,
required for an enlightened being, is met when that being is also required, for
reasons of selfless compassion, to teach about the way to enlightenment. The
strategy is to construe insightful understanding – required for teaching – in such
a way as to make it clear that the import of cognitive purity is not compromised.
That import is freedom from conceptuality, where conceptuality is the ignorant
construction of a desiring subject and desirable world. To be cognitively pure is
therefore to be free from misunderstanding. To be so free is to be free from desire
(for, of course, the cessation of suffering comes from the cessation of desire). This
is because to be free of conceptuality is to not conceive of self and world in the
nexus of desire.
Pure cognition, therefore, is the highest good only because it is cleansed of
desire-inducing construction. Now, if that person’s understanding of the nature of
things, though inescapably conceptual, is such as to involve no desire, then the
important requirement for freedom will be met. Since that freedom is the import
of pure cognition, provided conception-loaded understanding too is free of desire,
it will not be at odds with the essence of pure cognition. There will then be no
tension here.
In the relevant passage, Kamalas! ı, la recalls S! a, ntaraks
0
ita’s earlier statement of
an objection by a brahmin philosopher of the Mı, ma, m
0
sa, school : ‘ If he (the
Buddha) sees through direct perception, through his own awareness, he would
become attached to impure (experiential) flavours…’(TS, 3144).9 I use ‘flavour’
for ‘rasa ’, to capture the simultaneously specific notion of taste and the general
and weighty concept of ‘ the way things are to awareness’ (hence the contempor-
ary philosophical term, ‘phenomenal flavour’ for the ‘what-it-is-likeness’ of
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experience). Flavour, then, is a metaphor for phenomenology. S! a, ntaraks
0
ita
reasons with his interlocutor that conception-loaded cognition need not always
commit the cognizer to contact and desire.
If the Knowing Person is intoxicated because his sensory organs form a
relationship with impure flavours, then alone is he to be reproached. He [in fact]
becomes conscious of existent things mentally, and though not actually getting
them, knows that which is controverted as [only] provisional (TS, 3317–3318,
1047).10
Kamalas! ı, la helpfully (and pointedly) glosses the picturesque ‘ intoxicated’ as
‘being in direct contact ’. To be intoxicated with objects is to be overwhelmed by
being in direct contact with them through the sensory apparatus. This is how we
ordinarily grasp and get objects (in the epistemic rather than merely physical
sense). To be thus is to lack control over them and to take them as objects of desire
(or the desire to avoid). The question now is as to how there can be any under-
standing – grasping of the nature – of the world when contact is needed but
‘ intoxication’ is to be avoided. The enlightened or knowing person, the Buddha,
must both know things as they are and yet remain pure. S! a, ntaraks
0
ita argues that
enlightened awareness is consciousness of the world without sensory contact.
Kamalas! ı, la notes that this account is specific to a metaphysics built on idealism
towards objects. In other words, only the Yoga, ca, ra metaphysics, which utilizes
cittama‘ tra – the theory of consciousness-alone – at some stage, is coherent.
All these objections cease [in any case], for they would exist only if external objects
were possible. But in idealism (or mentalism), this is far from being given any
room. It is thus: ultimately, no bodily form is possible, so there can be nothing
impure about them. Not can there be any traces through the conceptualisation of
that [bodily form] because everything arises through ideas alone (TSP 3317–3318,
1047).11
Of course, he cannot mean that there is no impurity in life, for that would be to
deny the very basis of the Buddhist insight about suffering. What he means is that,
once it is understood that there are no objects and subjects to desire and desire
for, there will be no suffering or impurity. Although he characterizes it as ‘mind-
only’, and ‘idealism’ is a good translation as well, the metaphysics is more than
the mere denial of the external world and its reduction to mental objects that the
characterization suggests. The ultimate position involves a denial of the reality of
external and mental entities as they appear in conceptualization (i.e., ordinary or
unliberated experience). It is a denial of any irreducible ontology, physical or
mental. It therefore goes beyond idealism to the doctrine of the ‘emptiness’ of all
essences. But the denial of the world of objects – i.e., idealism – is the first step in
that direction. Here, it is a necessary and important step, because it is in that world
that impurity is located.12 In a state in which it is understood that subject and object
are ideas or conceptual constructs, there is no impurity, even when actual
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experiences continue to occur. (This idea comes perilously close to the later
Advaitic notion that ultimately there is no suffering, once the nature of things is
understood, and that, real though experience is, liberation is figurative, because
there is always an ultimate state.)
In any case, knowing without sensory engagement is a significant notion in
Yoga, ca, ra-Madhyamaka thought. It is a form of contemplation that is non-
empirical. It is called bha‘ vana. Later in the text, S! a, ntaraks
0
ita makes the case that
this is the mode of understanding, i.e., epistemic grasp, for the enlightened person.
Whatever is noumenally contemplated on, it is that which manifests itself with
utter lucidity, upon the perfection of [such] contemplation, like with things desired.
Great sages noumenally contemplate all entities, repeatedly over a long time, in
their true form as empty, without self, and so on… . That understanding, coming
into existence through noumenal contemplation of existent things, is therefore
valid (TS, 3440–3442, 1084).13
Here, he uses the notion of noumenal contemplation to show how engagement
with the world is compatible with freedom from misunderstanding about its
nature. I use the cumbrous term ‘noumenal contemplation’ as a translation of
bha‘ vana to draw attention to the notion that in it there is supposed to be con-
sciousness of things without a sensory engagement with them. Now, it is possible
to distinguish between two interpretations of ‘ things-in-themselves’. The stronger
notion, due to Kant in the Western tradition, is of objects without the way they are
presented to the senses; they then are supposed to be epistimically ‘blank’, be-
yond the bounds of sense and therefore of description. Of course, if ‘noumenon’
is used in this way, then any cognitive state (like contemplation) of it would be a
contradiction in terms, for noumena precisely are things (if there are and can be
said to be such things) in themselves, without any reference whatsoever to grasp
of them. (I will ignore here the further complication that Kant may be thought to
have given different uses to ‘noumena’ and ‘things-in-themselves’.) The other,
and perhaps wider philosophical usage, is of noumena as objects grasped inde-
pendently of senses. That is to say, given that the normal epistemic grasp of objects
is phenomenal, in other words, as objects presented in and through the senses,
this special grasp of objects is noumenal in the sense that the modality of the
senses is not involved.
S! a, ntaraks
0
ita uses a conventional example in Yoga, ca, ra-Madhyamaka to suggest
a parallel in ordinary life. The belief is that in intense thought, as of one’s lover,
there is an awareness of the image and presence of that person even when there
is no sensory contact. There is awareness without experiential engagement with a
present object, a visualization to the greatest detail without actual seeing.
It is not entirely clear here whether the use of an ordinary example implies that
that contemplation is really of the same kind as is ordinarily available to us, only
encompassing an infinite number of entities. In such a model of qualitative simi-
larity, this would be a problem about the very possibility of knowledge of an
284 c. ram-prasad
infinite number of (or even all) entities. The example may just be, instead, a mere
analogy for an inconceivably different type of consciousness in which such all-
encompassing yet disengaged comprehension is possible. This is God’s power
without a god. Any further study would take us into the hoary debate over om-
niscience and the mode of apprehension that God or the God-like would have.14
This awareness, then, ‘ takes in’ – i.e., engages with – things without actually
being involved with them (without being ‘taken in’ by them). Noumenal contem-
plation is cognizing the way things are and not as they appear to and through the
senses; and paradoxically, contemplating things as they are in themselves is to
understand that they are not, in fact, things in themselves but constructed things.
It is their being constructed that is not understood when they are merely sensed,
i.e., grasped phenomenally. To cognize them as they are is to cognize them as
being such as not to be engaged with and desired. They are provisional on there
being conceptual constructions engendering and engendered by (in a circle of
interdependent arising) desire and fear.
This is insightful understanding; it is an epistemic achievement, and therefore
capable of being communicated and taught. Its very occurrence is predicated on
there being no vulgar attachment to the obstacles to freedom. S! a, ntaraks
0
ita says:
‘All entities, by reason of being things, being existents and so on, are illuminated
clearly in the single intellection that is grounded in the exalted state of noumenal
contemplation, like [ordinarily] with the beloved one, etc. ’ (TS, 3446, 1085),15 so
the enlightened person has cognition of things as they are. This is insightful
understanding, because it is knowledge that things are merely provisional on
conception and desire. For that very reason, such cognition is free from misun-
derstanding, and therefore, desire, since it is understood that desirable things are
merely conceptual. Understanding allows for the establishment and the teaching
of the Buddhist way. But there is also freedom from desire for the conceptually
constructed. Such freedom is the import of pure cognition. Conception-free
cognition is thought to be enlightenment because in it alone does freedom from
subject and objects of suffering-inducing desire seem possible. But cognitive
purity occurs due to the insight that subject and object are not worth desiring for
and desiring; i.e., it satisfies the requirement for freedom from desire. At the same
time, being in that state is not being conception-less; hence, there is no tension
between cognitive purity and the conceptuality required for teaching.
This attempt at resolution might be thought to be a failure. The objection is that
it is not possible to reconcile noumenal contemplation with desire and other
mental impurities that come through ignorance. In other words, the required state
of cognitive purity – at once cognition of objects and yet without suffering-
inducing engagement with them – is impossible. The objection is due to Thomas
Wood.16 I put the objection in my own words. S! a, ntaraks
0
ita and Kamalas! ı, la can be
understood as making this argument: First, pure cognition is omniscient (and
noumenal) cognition; and it is pure because it is without external objects. Second,
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it is omniscient and pure and the Buddha knows the nature of objects (as lacking
externality). Therefore, there is no conflict between the Buddha’s cognition being
omniscient and its being pure and undefiled despite being the cognition of objects.
Wood argues that this does not follow. The Buddhist holds that cognition is
reflexive. All cognition is reflexive cognition; for, according to the Buddhist, every
cognition is not only cognition of something, it is also cognition of there being that
cognition. The occurrence of a cognition and awareness of its occurrence are one
and the same thing (not merely simultaneous but constitutively identical). But that
means that if there is cognition of objects, as there must be if there is to be
omniscience, there is, by the same token, awareness of the occurrence of that
cognition. But cognition of objects is impure; therefore the awareness of that
cognition, being identical with it, is also impure. Hence, there can be no
omniscience without impurity, for the impurity is brought about by the
omniscience being of (constructed) objects and other such elemental impurities
of existence.
This objection holds, however, only if we ignore the limits of impurity.
Cognition of objects is impure because it leads to such states as desire and attach-
ment. But there is desire only because the nature of objects is not understood. If
the nature of objects – as not really external, and as ultimately conceptual – is
understood, then there is no desire. If there is no desire, there is no impurity as
such. There is a profound difference between our cognition of a thing and the en-
lightened person’s. The former is of it as it appears and therefore a catalyst for
various emotional responses to it, whereas the latter is of it as it is and therefore
not a catalyst for those responses. We cannot derive the existence of impurity or
affliction merely from the cognition. The Buddha’s cognition is indeed of objects ;
but being of objects as they are, it is pure and free of desire. Insight transforms
cognitive content through transformation of attitude.
Impurity is now seen, not as a matter of the simple occurrence of objects in the
content of cognition, but as one to do with the attitudes held as a consequence of
cognition. This is a tacit admission that the occurrence of (conceptually
constructed) objects in cognition is unavoidable in life, even in the post-enlight-
enment life of the Buddha. What can be changed, indeed, what changes, after
enlightenment is the attitude of the Buddha towards the objects that occur in
constructive cognition. It is perhaps to indicate this, although the distinction is
neither explicit not systematic, that the word san0 kalpa (which may be translated
as ‘simple conception’) is used for our unliberated and automatic con-
ceptualisation, while vikalpa (which may be translated as ‘discriminative concep-
tion’) is used to describe the continuing mental activity of the enlightened person.
Purity during a Buddha’s life (i.e., after a person’s enlightenment) should there-
fore be seen as a psychological matter of desirelessness (i.e., right attitude) towards
objects, not a phenomenological one of objectlessness. This brings us to the
second form of the tension and its dissolution.
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Phenomenological impurity
If the culmination of the path is the attainment of phenomenologically pure
cognition, how can there be teaching, when the former is pure exactly because it
is conception-free and the latter is the verbalization of concepts? As S! a, ntaraks
0
ita
puts the question to himself :
Here, the very first word cast out [by the enlightened person] supposes
speakership. Due to negative concomitance, there certainly is an incompatibility. If
there is (even) discriminative conception, there is speakership ; the omniscient
person is conception-free. A cognition never reaches the entity [as it is in suchness]
if burdened by linguistic expression. Here too, those who hold that speakership
conforms to analysis do not hold that omniscience can be allowed if speakership is
possible. Nor can omniscience be acknowledged, because of conceptual cognitive
states. Thus, if conception is killed off, speakership cannot be accomplished (TS,
3358–3361, 1067).17
Omniscience here is the understanding that comes of noumenal con-
templation, the knowing of things as they are (there are, after all, different ways of
using the term ‘all-knowing’). This is not a mere infinitely increased but still
ordinary cognitive capacity which catalogues all there is, though that too is poss-
ible, (this sort of knowing everything is confusingly called sarvasarvajnh a : all know-
ing of everything). Rather, it is cognition of the nature of all such entities as may
be catalogued in the former type of omniscience. It is knowledge of the nature of
all things (sarvajnh a).18 Knowing that nature is indeed to pervade, epistemically as
it were, all there is ; for it would seem that to know the nature of all things is to
know (or possess the ability to know) all that of which it is the nature. Whether this
distinction is coherent or sustainable is another matter.
The fundamental point is that pure cognition is pure in that it is free of con-
ception, but understanding seems irreducibly conceptual. This point remains
even when the conception is the especially discriminative one (vikalpa) that the
enlightened one has in distinguishing the nature of all things. I take this to
articulate the tension in a different way. We have considered the one that
concentrates on the implication of purity in the content of insight. The latter
concentrates on the consequence of insight : how can it be conception-free and
yet discharge the need, motivated by compassion, to teach of its attainability to
the suffering? The challenge S! a, ntaraks
0
ita poses to himself is one which goes to the
heart of Buddhism. Is the Buddha, who uses language by virtue of being a teacher,
not really enlightened? Or is it the case that, although such insight is possible, it
is a purely personal path and goal?
S! a, ntaraks
0
ita returns to the question (which he does not immediately answer at
its first asking above) much later (although Kamalas! ı, la indicates briefly in his
commentary, on the subsequent verses, the answer to come). He eventually gives
this answer. ‘It is not so; for all [simple] conceptions, which are afflictions, do not
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exist [in the omniscient person] because all impediments have been destroyed.
Who would prevent that [conception from arising] which is favourable to the
welfare of the world and therefore is proper (‘‘healthy’’)? ’ (TS, 3597, 1117).19 The
problem with conception – the simple conceptualization (sand kalpa) that charac-
terizes all unliberated activity – is that it leads to desire and fear, to attachment
and revulsion, to the afflictions of life as suffering. But the conceptions involved
in teaching, by one who has had insight, are morally different. Even if they are
about world and self, they occur in the consciousness of the enlightened person
only to help others release themselves from their suffering. Why should there be
any objections to their existence? This, of course, is roughly the same answer as
before, seeking to argue that, while there is indeed a tension, it should not be a
cause for worry. The tension would be worrying only if conceptions afflict the
person, but the conceptions of the enlightened person are not afflictions, they are
necessities required by the compassionate wish to teach.
Kamalas! ı, la, however, points out in his commentary here that the objection is
not just to do with affliction (klesU a) but, in consequence, with error (bhra‘ nta). The
tension is epistemic, not moral or psychological, for every conception, even a
beneficial one, is ultimately mistaken about suchness. S! a, ntaraks
0
ita recognizes
this, and so goes on:
In fact, he does not favour his conceptions as being [more] useful [than others’]. He
knows them to be without basis ; he is like a magician. The magician knows that
the image of some horse he has produced is not objective, and he is neither
deluded by nor attached to it (TS, 3598–3599, 1117).20
Conception in the enlightened person occurs with the simultaneous awareness
that the nature of appearance is conceptual ; this is different from the unliberated
situation in which the nature of the objects of appearance is not realized. (This
might be the distinction, as mentioned, which is sometimes indicated by the use
of the words vikalpa and sand kalpa respectively.) This is just to say that the con-
ceptual life after insight is one in which there is a transformation of attitude
towards objects (i.e., conceptual constructs) but not a transformation in the
cognitive or perceptual content itself. The magician, like his audience, does have
the same perceptual experience of a horse, for the conjuring up of an image
consists in just that; but he recognizes it for what it is, and hence does not
commit an error about its metaphysical status.
The effect of this response, harnessed to the appeal to beneficiality is, therefore,
somewhat different from that given to the first form of the tension. There, the
tension between the opposing demands of pure cognition and understanding was
resolved by arguing that, even in understanding, there is exactly that freedom from
attachment to conceptual constructs which is the import of pure cognition. In the
latter form of the tension, in contrast, the response is not so much a resolution as
an accommodation. The suggestion, that the cognition of the enlightened person
is marked by awareness that it is conceptual, does not alter the fact that conception
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continues. In both cases, the same end is achieved, namely, freedom from con-
ceptual construction; it is just that in the case of pure cognition, freedom is literal
and phenomenological, while in the case of understanding it is implicative and
attitudinal.
The objection here is that pure cognition and the teaching based on under-
standing are simply incompatible because, while the former is purified of con-
ception, the latter necessarily requires it. The first response does not meet this
objection; it admits that there is conception in teaching, only pointing out that it
does not bind as it does in unenlightened life. So S! a, ntaraks
0
ita says here that the
incompatibility is worrying only if it is not realized that the world of experience is
conceptually constructed; only then does it lead to afflictions and suffering. When
conception occurs only because of a conscious and compassionate decision to
teach others of the nature of that conception, then it is not worrying to the
Buddhist. He recognizes that the enlightened person deliberately indulges in con-
ceptual activity despite having attained pure cognition.21
(It must be remembered that when it is said that the person attains pure
cognition, what is meant is that there is the occurrence of a pure cognitive state in
the stream or series of consciousness-states that contingently have their locus in
the psychophysical complex. It is clearly not the case that there is some being, a
unified self, which has attained pure cognition. So, to speak of attainment is only
to speak figuratively of the person, not literally of a unified self.)22
In this response, some sort of impurity is admitted but in such a way that the
necessary compatibility between the original pure cognition of the awakening and
the subsequent conceptuality of the teaching life of the Buddha is preserved. The
impurity is purely phenomenological. The world – the construction that binds –
does constitute the content of awareness. It is its occurrence thus that permits all
the movements and words of a compassionate career after the event that Gautama
Siddha, rtha underwent under the bodhi tree. To that extent, the stream of con-
sciousness does carry the slurry of concepts; but, to stay with the metaphor, it does
not mix. We have already seen that the requisite purity is preserved through the
attitude the Buddha has towards the conceptual world, which attitude is based on
his knowledge of its nature.
Conclusion
In effect, then, the Yoga, ca, ra-Madhyamaka synthetic school accommodates
the tension between insight as pure cognition and as understanding, by accepting
that they are indeed different. But the latter is important for the compassionate
task of teaching others and helping them, whereas the former is the culmination
of the path. The person who attains it, because not selfish (literally !), will return to
conception-loaded consciousness in order to teach the path of attainment to
others.
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What remains pure – the attitude of desirelessness, based on knowledge of
things as they are – is what is required for authoritative teaching, while what has
to become impure for such teaching to be possible – the phenomenological under-
going of things as they are in experience – does not vitiate that necessary purity.
The importance of this accommodation lies in the fact that by acknowledging
the persistence of conceptuality in the enlightened person, the Buddhist
acknowledges too the persistence of world-engagement in that person. Of course,
such a person knows of the nature of conceptuality and therefore of the nature of
the unliberated, world-engaged and world-constructing life ; but nonetheless, he
continues to exist in it. What now demands examination is what the attitude
towards conceptual phenomena implies about the Buddha’s relationship with the
world. It is true that the enlightened person is not engaged with the constructs of
experience regarding the world and self ; but what of the experience of other
persons? After all, is not compassion exactly engagement with the various
phenomena of suffering, and is not such engagement attitudinal? Thus it is that
we are led to the fundamental problem of Buddhist axiology, the nature, need and
consequence of altruism and the Buddha’s (and the bodhisattva’s) continued
existence within suffering.
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